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My first reaction, on reading David DeGrazia's 
review of the second edition of Animal Liberation, 
was to applaud, He has located the strengths and 
weaknesses of the book with a rare precision. If his 
praise is too generous, I shall leave it to others to take 
him to task over that. To me, it is particularly pleasing 
because it is not the praise of an uncritical admirer. 
Nor did my urge to applaud fade away when I turned 
to the final, most critical, section of the review, for 
here I found DeGrazia's criticisms do indeed point to 
aspects of the book's argument that are, at best, 
incompletely developed. 
DeGrazia is right to say that some of his criticisms 
go more deeply into philosophical theory than I wanted 
to do in AL. When I came to write the second edition, I 
knew that there was now a mass of sophisticated 
philosophical literature on the topic that had not existed 
when I wrote the fIrst edition. At fIrst I planned to respond 
to it, but I soon realized that if I were to do so, I would be 
writing a different, and much less readable, book. That 
was something I did not want to do. I vaguely intend to 
write a comprehensive "reply to my critics" on some 
future occasion; meanwhile other projects fill my time, 
projects more stimulating and, I think, more fruitful than 
the tedious prospect of exposing the flaws in a volley of 
objections, some of which are of interest only insofar as 
they provide evidence of the lengths to which intelligent 
people with philosophical training can goin order to avoid 
the need to change their diet. 
I do not, however, include in the scope of that last 
sentence the difficulties to which DeGrazia points in 
the final part of his review. The matters to which he 
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refers are of real philosophical interest and are central 
to my approach to the ethics of our relations with 
animals. So I shall try to say something about them. 
First, DeGrazia presents a challenge to the principle 
of equal consideration of interests which he refers to as 
"the argument from social bondedness." My response 
to this challenge, as presented by Mary Midgley and 
more recently by Jeffrey Gray,! is indeed the one 
DeGrazia describes as "Singerian." This DeGrazia 
suggests is not good enough, because "many clear-
thinking philosophers" will not be satisfied by it. Like 
W. D. Ross, they will think that the nature of the 
relationship of the parent and child in itself justifies 
preferential treatment, and any overall benefits are 
fortuitous. 
I don't think that these philosophers have thought 
clearly enough. If they had, they would have discarded 
the kind of ethical intuitionism espoused by Ross, 
because they would have realized that our intuitions 
are not a reliable guide to what we, as reflective 
reasoning beings, can justify. After all, for most of 
human history almost all males (and probably even 
most females) have thought that the nature of the 
relationship of the husband and wife, in itself, requires 
. obedience on the part of the wife. And as recently as 
the turn of the century, Hastings Rashdall, one of the 
most distinguished British philosophers of his day, 
thought that the self-evident wrongness of sexual 
permissiveness was a decisive objection to any form 
of hedonistic utilitarianism? 
When we look at the specific relationship to which 
Midgley and DeGrazia refer-the relationship between 
parent and child-it is true that there are very strong 
natural feelings associated with this relationship. That 
is, of course, why it is so much better that parents should 
normally be responsible for the welfare of their own 
children: Their natural feelings will lead them to fulfill 
the task far better than any impersonal system of social 
welfare. But if we allow strong natural feelings to be a 
sufficient basis for the derivation of moral rights and 
obligations, we will be in serious trouble, as even a 
cursory glance at race relations in many different 
countries will show. 
The second challenge, the view that being human 
just is a morally relevant characteristic, is logically 
troubling. DeGrazia gets it exactly right, however, 
when he says that although a defence of the claim that 
humans deserve greater consideration than animals is 
not logically required to refer to any traits about 
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humans beyond the fact that they are human, no 
satisfactory defence of this claim could limit itself to 
this fact. DeGrazia is tentative about this. His 
hesitations might be overcome if he were to consider 
that the notion of what it is to be "human" is neither 
transparent nor uncontroversial, as we can see when 
we look at discussions of the status of the human 
embryo, of anencephalic humans, and of those whose 
brains have irreversibly ceased to function, either as 
a whole or in those sections responsible for 
consciousness. When the proponents of what 
DeGrazia calls the "sui generis view" are forced to 
come clean on what they mean by "human," their case 
begins to unravel. If, in the end, they come down to 
mere membership of the species Homo sapiens, they 
should be asked whether the discovery that green-eyed 
people are in fact a different species (though in every 
aspect of their mental and emotional lives just like 
humans) would mean that green-eyed people are not 
entitled to the same consideration as the rest of us. 
There is, of course, no knockdown logical objection 
to saying that, in that hypothetical situation, we would 
indeed be entitled to treat green-eyed people with less 
consideration than others. But now the arbitrariness 
of the species boundary is so glaring that no one will 
find such an answer convincing. 
In objecting to my failure to explain what equal 
consideration comes to, DeGrazia makes one minor 
error that should be corrected. After quoting my view 
that it is not arbitrary to hold that different lives many 
have different values, he adds: "I assume this means 
that the life ofa normal adult human and that ofa mouse 
are not to be given equal consideration, for if one must 
choose between them, one should, on this view, save 
the human." The conclusion is right, but the fIrst part 
of the assumption is loosely put; one should give the 
mouse and the human equal consideration (that is, the 
scales by which one compares what the human gets out 
of life and what the mouse gets out of life should be 
impartial), but the upshot of that equal consideration 
will be, I suggest, that we value the life of the normal 
human more highly than that of the mouse, because 
from an impartial perspective, the normal human does 
have more to lose. So there is no question of "what 
determines whether two interests, or sets of interests, 
are identical or sufficiently similar that equal 
consideration applies to them." As I indicated in 
Practical Ethics (p. 92, although not quite in these 
words), I should be willing to give equal consideration 
Winter 1992 
Singer: Response 
to the lives of the weeds I pull out of my garden. It is 
just that when I do so, and put myself in their place, 
using the best available knowledge about what it is like 
to be a weed pulled out of a garden, I decide that the 
life of the weed is a complete blank; it has no 
experiences, and so has nothing to lose. Equal 
consideration of my interest in growing tomatoes and 
the weed's "interest" in living, is perfectly appropriate, 
but since it reveals that the weed has no interest in living, 
it will always favor my interest in growing tomatoes. 
I hope that I am not here using a linguistic device 
to avoid a substantive objection. If, as I suspect, 
DeGrazia is here raising, in less than entirely precise 
language, the point that it is very difficult to compare 
different interests across species, and hence very 
difficult to determine when one interest is or is not 
equal to another, I can only agree. But we just have to 
try our best, in much the same way that, when choosing 
within our own family, we have to try our best to 
determine when one child's interest in going to the 
beach is or is not equal to another child's interest in 
visiting the new skateboard ramp. 
If this is not the place for DeGrazia to review the 
many objections made to act-utilitarianism, it is 
certainly not the place for me to defend it. I think, in 
hindsight, that-given my aim of writing AL so that it 
could be accepted by people with a wide variety of 
ethical views-I should have been more cautious in 
my phrasing of the passage on p. 85 which DeGrazia 
quotes as establishing "fairly clearly" my act-
utilitarianism. To the objection that an experiment on 
a single animal might save many lives, it would have 
been enough to present my opponents with a choice: 
either they accept that in those circumstances it would 
also be right to perform the experiment on a brain-
damaged human, or they deny that it is justifiable to 
perform the experiment on any sentient third party, 
human or nonhuman. 
The underlying ethical issue still remains: What 
should we think of utilitarianism in general, and of 
act-utilitarianism in particular? Since I accept much 
of what R. M. Hare says about the distinction between 
everyday moral thinking and the level of critical 
reflection on morality (see his Moral Thinking ),3 I am 
not sure if I should be regarded as an act-utilitarian. I 
originally accepted that label because I knew that I 
was not a rule-utilitarian; now, fortunately, utilitarians 
have a number of interesting options from which to 
choose. I remain, however, a utilitarian, and on that 
issue my differences with DeGrazia do, as he indicates, 
reflect our different views about the status of moral 
intuitions, and ultimately, about the basis of ethics. 
Since that topic continues to challenge me, I hope, 
eventually, to have more to say on it. But that will 
have to wait. 
Notes 
1 See Jeffrey A. Gray, "On the morality of speciesism" 
and Peter Singer, "Speciesism. morality and biology: a 
response to Gray," The Psychologist (May, 1991). 
2 Hastings Rashdall. The Theory ofGood and Evil, vol. I 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), p. 197. 
3 R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University 
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